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After spending 17 years in prison for his Marxist affiliations, this Berber teacher 
turned his activism to human rights. Starting in 2000, Driss Benzekri chaired the 
Instance Équité et Réconciliation (IER) responsible for shedding light on the political 
repression and human rights violations committed during the period between 
independence and the end of King Hassan II’s reign (1956-1999). Beginning in 
2005, he chaired the Conseil consultatif des droits de l’homme (CCDH).
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In memory of Driss Benzekri
(1950-2007)
In 2004, Rights & Democracy published the study Democratic Development and 
Civil Society Movements in Morocco: Analysis and Strategic Actions, the fruit of a 
participatory process carried out in partnership with Espace Associatif and in 
close collaboration with Moroccan civil society. This analysis of various aspects of 
democratic development in Morocco sought to promote a better understanding 
of the role of civil society in an ever-changing political climate. In 2005-2006, four 
regional forums were held across the country. The objectives of these meetings 
were to increase and enrich national collaboration and coordination among the 
various stakeholders in Moroccan civil society, with the goal of formulating better 
strategies for civil society at the local, regional and national levels. These forums 
brought together hundreds of civil society stakeholders to discuss the problems 
they were confronting in their respective regions and communities. 
Rights & Democracy then developed a partnership with the Association régionale de 
développement du Gharb, a community association located in Sidi Yahia du Gharb, 
close to Rabat. One of the association’s missions is to promote the involvement of 
the region’s youth in a democratic participation process, and to provide them with 
advocacy training. 
Throughout 2007, several initiatives were launched that fell within the framework 
of the previous programme cycle, with the goal of building the capacity of the 
various stakeholders in Moroccan society. Specifically, within the framework of a 
project sponsored by Elections Canada and Rights & Democracy, Moroccan media 
representatives visited Montréal and Ottawa to learn more about Canada’s rules 
and procedures for ensuring fair election coverage. Rights & Democracy and the 
Institut national démocratique pour les affaires internationales du Maroc (IND) 
organized a visit by the campaign strategists of four major Moroccan political 
parties to observe the election campaign in Québec. 
The Board of Directors of Rights & Democracy decided to hold its annual 
conference in Morocco on the basis of several factors, namely, the strength of 
Moroccan civil society, the reforms promoting democracy and rule of law, and 
the elections scheduled for September 2007. In organizing this event for the 
first time outside Canada, Rights & Democracy worked in partnership with the 
Casablanca-based Collectif Démocratie et Modernité (CDM). Founded in February 
2003, this Moroccan coalition is composed of non-governmental associations and 
leading figures from civil society. Its mission is to organize debates, conferences 
and seminars and to promote activities in all milieus with the goal of promoting or 
defending democracy and progress. 
The following is a collection of some of the talks given by speakers who submitted 
their texts following the conference and our call for submissions. 
Razmik Panossian
Director of Policy, Programmes and Planning
Rights & Democracy
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Preface
On the Universality of Democracy
By Jean-Louis Roy
“Democracy coexists with a broad range of spiritual, cultural and social traditions. Full 
recognition of the idea of a common quest, the singularity of the democratic ideal, the plurality 
of democratic systems and the inclusion of the “social substance” should inform our debates 
and our efforts to advance democracy around the world in the 21st century.”
Allow me to begin by telling you about the wonderful welcome I received from Driss 
Moussaoui, former President of the Collectif Démocratie et Modernité, when I came 
knocking at his door to propose the undertaking that brings us together: it was warm, 
immediate and he offered many ideas. Our sense of fellowship deepened as we worked out 
a joint project between our two organizations.
I am also cognizant of the contributions of Nacer Chraibi, current President of the Collec-
tif Démocratie et Modernité, and his colleagues in the steering committee, and I warmly 
thank them. As well, I wish to thank the Chair of Rights & Democracy’s Board of Directors, 
Janice Stein, and the other Board members who are here with us. From the outset, they 
gave their support to the idea and realization of our conference.
Morocco’s recent march toward democracy is unquestionably the most committed since 
the beginning of the new century. It is firmly rooted in history, from your struggle against 
the protectorate, the involvement of many in the national movement after 1955, and the 
part played by your historic political parties, which have been joined by many newer ones 
since.
The 1962 Constitution made any move towards a single party system illegal. That of 1996, 
the fifth, initiated the principale of changeover of political power. In the opinion of many 
analysts, this decision constituted a transition towards democracy. Between these two his-
toric dates, there has been a long process, including the creation of the Equity and Recon-
ciliation Commission.
The first six years of this century have been, in your history, a period of great democratic 
debate, expanding politically the fundamental principles of your constitution. I refer, in 
particular, to the first article that affirms the democratic character of your country, rein-
forced by the concept of the equality of all Moroccans (Article 5), and the affirmation of 
equal civil and political rights for all adult citizens of both genders (Article 8).
The implementation of these principles, while of course debated, is unprecedented. Ex-
amples include the reform of family law (the Moudawana), the new law on citizenship, a 
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Opening Addresses
formula in your 2002 electoral law to guarantee 
the presence of women in the Parliament, which 
resulted in your country going from the last place 
to first in the Arab world with respect to female 
parliamentary representation, and finally, the 
2002 election, which led to advances for new po-
litical forces, including the Justice and Develop-
ment Party (PJD).
Finally, the recognition of the Amazigh (Berber) 
culture and the launching of the Royal Institute of 
the Amazigh Culture are also a part of this period 
of major debates and great democratic achieve-
ments. I know that all this is still being discussed 
through impassioned and passionate debates on 
issues such as voting procedures and the revision 
of the constitution.
Please allow me to tell you that, viewed from 
outside, these choices are clearly converging to-
ward a democratic culture. So much so, that they 
mobilize your civil society, which is organized, 
vibrant and capable of making suggestions. We 
are also aware of the scale of the issues and chal-
lenges posed here, as in many countries, by the 
full realization of social and economic rights. In 
his speech from the throne on July 30, 2002, the 
King drew up a stirring enumeration of these is-
sues and challenges.
Incomplete, yes, but indisputable, Morocco’s 
long march toward a democratic culture is part 
of a global movement which, in this last quar-
ter of a century, has changed  geopolitical reality 
worldwide, with the number of countries calling 
themselves democratic doubling in this period.
We will be discussing all these points. Is the wave 
of democratization still strong and productive in 
the world? Is democracy a universal aspiration?
Democracy is not the monopoly of anyone, or of 
any particular era of civilization.
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Democracy cohabits with a wide variety of spiri-
tual, cultural and social heritages. It is a shared 
quest with the goal of putting into practice the 
universality of democratic values and their imple-
mentation, while integrating the diversity of all 
countries of the world.
We must understand, accept and appreciate that 
the singularity of the democratic ideal can be 
embodied in a wide variety of democratic systems. 
Secularization is conceived in a radically different 
manner, for example, in Western societies and 
in India. Democracy can be poured into these 
two moulds: the West’s rejection of all religious 
references and the equal respect for all religions 
in India.
We must be careful not to propose abstract proj-
ects, but to ensure that local realities and needs, 
and the distinctive character of spiritual, cultural 
and social heritages be completely taken into ac-
count. Democratization does not mean western-
ization. This myth must be debunked. Intercul-
tural differences and similarities are equally real.
Even a quick glance at the current state of the 
human family and what it is becoming should 
convince us that it is not enough to consider de-
mocracy solely from the angle of political rights. 
It also includes socioeconomic rights.
Every system of democratic governance evolves in 
a changing world. Such a system takes its energy 
from the complexity of the spiritual, cultural and 
social needs of its components, i.e. every individual 
human being and collective entities is an attempt 
to reach an equilibrium that must deal with the 
paradox of “legal equality” and “social inequality.”
The time has come to conciliate and harmonize 
political, economic or social and cultural rights. 
These categories of rights are indissociable and 
should be applied with the same rigour.
Over the past several years, Morocco has under-
gone remarkable advances in such areas as political, 
social and women’s rights. The beginning of the 
process of change could be attributed to the con-
stitutional reform of 1996, which brought about, 
for the first time in the country’s history, a govern-
ment in which political power changes hands.
There was also the creation of the Equity and 
Reconciliation Commission, which examined the 
country’s past and enabled many Moroccans to 
make peace with their history. There was also the 
creation of the Royal Institute of the Amazigh 
Culture, with the legal and factual recognition 
of the Amazigh language as a national language, 
taught to all Moroccan children at school and of 
the Amazigh culture as part of the national heri-
tage that every Moroccan is proud of.
Women benefited from particular attention, be-
cause the family law reform gave women the 
same rights as men, in most areas. The practice 
of polygamy has been strictly reined in by condi-
tions that precede the authorization of a second 
marriage. Divorce has become a shared right and 
ruled by the court with regulations regarding the 
management of goods acquired during the mar-
riage. Legal tutelage of children is now ensured 
jointly by the father and the mother. The rights 
of children are recognized.
The educational reform, initiated under the reign 
of King Hassan II, continued and there were new 
developments in schooling, with the recent in-
troduction of human rights being taught at the 
primary level, and revision of school manuals to 
introduce into teaching practices an opening 
onto the world and tolerance.
New laws respecting freedom of the press lifted 
some restrictions on the work of journalists and 
the media. The new political party law has the 
objective of rehabilitating the political arena and 
obliging more internal democracy and transpa-
rency within the political parties.
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Democratic and Social Revolution in
Contemporary Morocco
By Nacer Chraibi
Obligatory health insurance now covers 30% of 
the population, up from only 15% previously. 
The other 70% of the population, made up of 
the most deprived social groups, will benefit from 
free medical assistance within public health struc-
tures.
On the economic front, Morocco is a huge work-
site, from north to south, with the creation of 
the Tanger-Med port and a free-trade zone; with 
the creation of a road that will link the Mediter-
ranean towns of the north; with the construction 
of highways between Casablanca and Tangiers, 
Rabat and Fez, Casablanca and Marrakesh, and 
soon, between Marrakesh and Agadir.
Special effort has been made in the mountainous 
areas to open them up and to give the people 
living there access to running water, electricity, 
medical care and education.
The National Human Development Initiative 
(INDH) was launched to battle poverty and mar-
ginalization throughout the entire country, tar-
geting especially the poorest areas and popula-
tions. Of course, nothing is perfect, and many 
problems remain, including high levels of unem-
ployment and illiteracy, as well as many areas of 
substandard housing.
The Moroccan economy remains very depen-
dent on rainfall and social measures have been 
slow in coming because the State’s resources are 
limited by bad harvests. But current investment 
and open worksites lead us to hope that there 
will be notable improvement in the economic 
and social situation of Moroccans in the coming 
years.
Finally, to the country’s credit, a civil society has 
been developed that is massively involved at 
every level and that remains vigilant with respect 
to gains, both old and new, and in particular, 
those concerning human rights.
From Political Democracy to
Social Democracy
By Guido Riveros Franck
Latin America began a cycle of democracy in the 1980s, at a time when a political, 
economic and cultural “globalization,” concurrent with the hegemony of the so-called 
“Pax Americana,” was being formed.
With the Washington Consensus, a model of political governance and a market-based 
economy rooted in economic efficiency and competitiveness became widespread, together 
with a redefining of the state and its role in the diverse aspects of social, regional and 
economic life.
Democracy met electoral expectations of institutional formality, consolidating political 
citizenship, but accumulating a worrisome deficit in social matters. Poverty and inequality 
thus never ceased to be the main problems.
In 1990, the percentage of the population living in poverty was between “45 and 47%, 
while in 2006, over 40% of Latin Americans [were] poor.’’1 Democracy was unable to 
effectively improve the living conditions of the disadvantaged, who had fervently hoped 
that it would be able to satisfy their most urgent needs.
Today, thanks to the spread of information, the surge in means of mass communication, 
freedom of the press, and the work of international and local organizations to make economic 
information more accessible, it is not only possible for citizens to be more informed and 
up to date, but also to be more critical, as they compare different realities and living 
conditions with an astounding ease only made possible by modern digital technology. 
“Civil society” thus has more expectations and a firm resolve to improve its standard of 
living. To that end, it has developed a growing ability to pressure those in power and does 
not hesitate to mobilize in large numbers when it deems necessary.
With respect to inequality, we find societies in which the disparity between the richest and 
the poorest has grown. “The income gap between the fifth of the world’s people living 
in the richest countries and the fifth in the poorest was 74 to 1 in 1997, up from 60 to 1 
in 1990, and 30 to 1 in 1960.”2 This demonstrates that the policies implemented in the 
last decade of the past century have aggravated an economic inequality which, in many 
countries, has prevented the creation of a social citizenship that makes possible full societal 
participation in political and state life.
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Democracy: A Universal Value?
With so much poverty and social inequality, is 
political stability possible in the region? Or, if 
we are to continue in this fashion, should we 
expect a period of weakening of the state and 
delegitimization of politics and of its institutional 
actors, with greater social fragmentation, 
antagonistic polarization among divergent 
national sectors?
Why is democracy unable to handle our economies 
more efficiently and why does it not have the 
capacity to ensure fairer distribution of income 
among the various classes of the population?
We have reached a point at which the poorest 
and most marginalized sectors of the population, 
the indigenous peoples, or “aboriginals,” and 
peasant labourers do not identify with “neo-
liberal democracy” or with the current party 
system. This has increased distrust of those in 
power, of representational mechanisms such as 
the national parliament, local deliberative bodies 
and the political class, all of which are instruments 
that have proven to be incapable of meeting the 
demands of employment, productive investment 
and social inclusion.
The perception of the citizenry is that democracy 
has not solved its problems. The political parties 
that were able to articulate a utopia of freedom 
during the dictatorships to garner approval 
from a large part of the population thus gaining 
significant support and political legitimacy, have 
not turned out to be very creative. They were 
too limited by the demands of international 
organizations, and lacked the courage or 
conviction to create an alternative discourse 
with greater social content and national vision. 
It would seem that through globalization, “the 
power to make decisions regarding the direction 
of economic political development has been 
effectively transferred from countries to detached, 
distant, and undemocratic multilateral bodies 
such as the IMF, WB and WTO.”3
Both the pro-government parties and the opposi-
tion parties have been trapped in the labyrinth 
of power and the absence of creative intellectual 
debate. They have been bereft of new ideologies 
and values to make the political attractive, which 
would serve to restore, at the least, a mobilizing 
centrality to political matters—a centrality which 
would make it possible to organize the various 
emergent public spaces and social actors.
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Even more, the opportunity has been lost to 
lay the foundations for a national plan which 
would focus on politics, and coherently define 
diversity and the capacity to affect, profoundly 
and sustainably, the future of matters economic, 
social, historical and cultural.
People began to identify the political players and 
those in power with large economic corporations 
and “transnational companies” which pillage our 
natural resources, circumvent tax laws, and do 
not generate stable or well-paid employment. 
In addition to the demands of “structural 
[economic] reforms” came the establishment 
of a market economy which dismantled the 
weak State apparatuses, taking away from their 
ability to deal with issues of education, health, 
production, housing, climate vulnerability 
(drought, floods, natural disasters), and lack of 
protection for the national market, particularly 
“sensitive [agricultural] products.”
This neglect of social and national problems and 
the exclusion of productive social organizations 
from the development of public policy—which 
resulted in reducing the legitimacy of government 
programmes and weakening the ability to 
control the economic, commercial and financial 
conditioning of international organizations—
helped to increase discontent with democracy.
Thus it was that in 2004, according to the report 
on democracy in Latin America prepared by the 
United Nations Development Programme, 47% 
supported democracy in Mexico and Central 
America, 44% in the MERCOSUR region of South 
America, and 37% in the Andean region.
These percentages showed the interrelationship 
between the development of democracy and 
the economy according to geographical region. 
Greater acceptance or rejection of democracy 
depended on its economic effect. It is no 
coincidence that in the Andean region (Venezuela, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia) there has 
been greater mistrust of the democratic system. In 
this region, in addition to the economic issues and 
State weakness previously mentioned, there were 
and still are major problems regarding the inclusion 
of indigenous sectors in political and economic 
life, rural poverty and urban marginalization, and 
drug-trafficking and illegal crops, all of which are 
fuelled by inadequate government management 
and growing corruption in public administration. 
However, it should be acknowledged that, since 
2004, this political and social framework has 
undergone some notable changes in countries 
such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, where the 
overwhelming victory of candidates connected to 
the popular and indigenous sectors has awakened 
new hope among the citizenry for the economic 
and political future. These, as Felipe Gonzáles has 
termed them, “energetic nationalisms” or “recurrent 
nationalisms” that have emerged, and that appear 
throughout the pendulum of Latin America’s 
history, have in common an upsurge in the price of 
hydrocarbons and raw materials, the institutional 
precariousness of national states, and the collapse 
of “systemic parties.” There are, nevertheless, 
significant differences among them, such as the 
“21st-century socialism” of Hugo Chávez, and 
the populist-indigenous championing, with all its 
programmatic and administrative management 
limitations, of Evo Morales in Bolivia.
Party-free Politics
The main components in the economic and social 
framework described are the profound crisis of 
the party system, and the ongoing questioning 
of the political and of representative democracy. 
Within this framework, an imbalance began 
to arise between the expectations and needs 
of the public, and the programmatic proposal 
of the political parties. The party apparatuses 
held fast to a bureaucratic-legal logic, in which 
“democratic formality” was more important than 
the citizens’ demand for greater openness in the 
political system and equality of opportunity in 
the exercise of political representation.
Political parties entered a crisis and lost popular 
support because they were no longer “social 
aggregators” representing collective and majority 
interests; they lost their connection to society and 
no longer spoke of a national plan. They were 
more interested in the market than the state, they 
encouraged private interests to the detriment of 
public interests, and they became more elitist and 
removed from the people. “From the moment 
that politics seems less relevant in relation to how 
people perceive their individual and collective 
destinies, the very activity expressed through the 
parties necessarily begins to revolve around itself 
in somewhat of a vacuum.”4
Political parties began to isolate and close them-
selves off, and no longer genuinely represented 
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the citizens. They became mediators for other in-
terests and not for those that really matter to soci-
ety. This programmatic mistake was made worse 
by democratic stagnation, loss of values, and loss 
of behavioural standards within the parties. In this 
absence of political paradigms, in this ideological 
vacuum there was an emergence of caciquismos 
[despotism], prebendalismos [type of electoral gift-
giving, or bribery], elitist and nepotistic practices, 
and vertical leadership. Orders supplanted debate 
to exact submissive obedience instead of eliciting 
intelligent discipline and loyalty, thereby replac-
ing the voter with the militant, and suppressing 
reflection so as to unconditionally accept the eco-
nomic and institutional policies of the Washing-
ton Consensus.
This is when substitutes for political organizations 
began to emerge, in a quest to establish party-free 
politics. Save for rare exceptions, we can state that 
democracies in Latin America are weak because 
they are based on unstable political organizations 
that are not consolidated as parties and that do not 
manage to build a real political system. The causes 
of this structural problem affecting “the political” 
can be found in predominant cultural habits, 
elites that are not constitutionally established and 
lack a profound national/State vision, a lack of 
territorial/geographical integration with internal 
regional imbalances, clusters of poor/indigenous/
rural populations left out of the marketplace, and, 
in the national economy, monoproduction based 
on an important natural resource which favours 
service and transport infrastructure development 
in certain geographic areas.
To the above must be added scarce or overdue 
development of farming—on land which 
historically has been concentrated in the 
hands of the few, and which has indigenous/
peasant labourer populations subjected to over-
exploitation as cheap and abundant labour—
and a lack of industrial development without 
employment policies and training of labour.
To summarize, we could say that for a long time, 
the “ruling elites” preferred living a “comfortable 
and easy life” in their countries to building 
nations, cultivating citizenship and developing 
solid institutions. A State apparatus based on legal 
standards and public institutions was created to 
constitute an instrument of power which would 
guarantee the permanence of a political core 
in government. In the best of cases, this made 
possible electoral alternation and shared power 
which had no objective other than the financial 
gain of a small privileged “oligarchic” group.
This narrow concept of nation did not require 
full citizenship and solid political organizations. 
In dispensing with creative intellectuals, a 
nation state was unnecessary. Instead arose a 
government apparatus which, by distributing 
its largesse (prebendismo) in the administrative 
spheres, was able to maintain the public’s 
political support for routine elections, dignifying 
by the vote the national and local representatives 
chosen by the elite to fulfill their functions within 
this instrumental political model.
For these reasons, there was never an interest in 
an authentic development of politics, and parties 
were structures without a democratic internal 
life, with leaders in positions for life and with 
programmes that reflected their economic and 
business interests. This explains why, for a large 
part of our history, political parties have obeyed a 
given sector of society, and have not transversally 
represented it.
Despite this, based on diverse global ideological 
currents, parties with liberal, conservative, socialist, 
communist, Christian-democratic and other char-
acteristics arose. Others decided to represent social 
classes or groups such as workers, peasant labour-
ers, indigenous peoples and the middle class. In the 
1930s, as a result of the “economic crisis of capital-
ism” and of the vision of “development within,” 
which promoted policies of “import substitution” 
and the implementation of a process of industri-
alization, populist movements began to appear. 
These movements advocated “class alliances,” 
managing to attract diverse sectors of society so as 
to broaden politics and implement economic land 
and labour reforms. They extended political citi-
zenship by means of universal suffrage in order to 
incorporate national majorities into political life, 
establishing the notion of the “national/popular” 
and instituting the welfare state.
Beyond Social Class
The reconversion of the world economy has had 
an important and not necessarily homogenous 
impact on our nations.
A phenomenon of “social decomposition and [...] 
de-socialization” has begun to occur, due to the 
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absence of a State seeking social cohesion.5 As the 
market grows and the State shrinks, the result is 
a fragmented society of innumerable nuclei and 
scattered groups. Rapidly, gaps appear between 
urban and rural areas; between powerful industrial 
cities and cities stagnating in their economic past; 
and between the capital cities of the republic and 
other cities lobbying for a decentralization of 
administrative bureaucracy.
In the social sphere, few sectors of the population 
benefit from the new economic model, which 
has resulted in a process of concentration of 
wealth and “social narrowing,” increasing the 
number of those excluded and marginalized by 
globalization.
Urban conglomerations grow in a disorderly 
manner, the result of a phenomenon of rural-
urban migration which, particularly in countries 
with a significant “aboriginal” population, gives 
rise to what some called “urban ruralization.” 
There is also, however, a component of territorial 
mobility in this migration: from the mountains to 
the coast, from the highlands to the plains and 
valleys, from one region to another, and from 
the provinces to the capital. This process leads 
to internal territorial differences and autonomous 
movements of a regional nature.
Latin American societies have thus become more 
complex and the poverty linked to ethno-cultural 
groups is exploding, vastly overwhelming the 
political parties, which are no longer organic 
channels for the electoral representation of these 
new social movements. As Alain Tourain very aptly 
points out, before, “we spoke of social actors 
and of social movements; in the world which we 
have already entered, we will more frequently 
have to speak of personal subjects and cultural 
movements.” The result is an inevitable logic of 
political self-representation, disorganization, and 
dissipation of the political.
To the above are added the non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) seeking to have the needs 
of the different sectors of our “sliced-up societies” 
met and addressed by the weak mechanisms of the 
State, the public allocations bereft of institutional 
structure and sufficient financial resources, and 
the stagnant apparatuses of the political parties. A 
large number of the NGOs inculcate an anti-State 
attitude and contribute to the development of 
movements of indigenous groups, neighbourhood 
groups, groups of peasant labourers who produce 
“organic food,” environmental groups, and gender- 
and generation-based groups. These movements 
reject the existing political organizations and 
have an unlimited tendency to dissolve partisan 
structures.
Thus it is that in several countries throughout our 
continent, “citizens’ organizations” proliferate. 
These organizations seek to send their representa-
tives directly to the national parliament or to region-
al and municipal deliberative bodies. “Community 
thinking goes beyond the old debate between left-
wing thought and right-wing thought, and sug-
gests a third social philosophy [...] The central idea 
is now the relationship between the individual and 
the community, as well as between freedom and 
order,” giving rise to multiple “civil libertarians” 
and “sensitive community members.”6
With the weakening of “civil society,” NGOs play 
the role of backing excluded sectors, supporting 
their organization, developing proposals and a 
sense of group membership. Often, however, 
instead of creating “social inclusion,” they 
develop extreme approaches which lead to large 
confrontational social mobilizations. Instead 
of making gradual progress by claiming space 
within government administration and being 
included in the establishment of public policies, 
they ultimately marginalize themselves vis-à-vis 
the political system.
The absence of a uniting factor in society, whether 
arising from the State or the political—because 
the former neglects social matters and distances 
itself from national groups, and the latter is 
uncapable of finding the means to adapt to 
“new realities”—generates a worrisome “political 
institutional vacuum” to be filled by multiple 
social actors with “anti-political politics.”
In this way societal stratification is destroyed 
and social classes have no “centralizing factors.” 
These have been replaced by new assemblages 
of people grouped according to different specific 
activities, with partisan interests and their own 
problems. Band-aid and short-term solutions 
take precedence over a planned future and a 
“Weltanschauung.” Focus is on the group and the 
community in isolation, using, varying intensities 
of mobilization as a pressure tactic to obtain only 
partial results, with no concern for possible harm 
to the rest of society, the national economy and 
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institutional order. A “tribalization”has arisen in 
which the individual is more important than the 
community, in which the group is more important 
than the “sense of community.”
The New Organization of the 
Political and the Social
Political representation has become increasingly 
fragile and peremptory, and those elected by 
the citizens are quickly delegitimized if they do 
not act exactly in keeping with the opinions of 
the sector they represent. It is a time of growing 
societal disintegration, and also of great weakness 
for the emerging social sectors. The proliferation 
of new groups creates organic shortages, an 
absence of standards of coexistence and a lack of 
behavioural standards, and the creators of these 
groups quickly rise and fall.
Each social group has its own particular interests, 
and seeks to construct its own identity in the 
battle for access to a space of power in which to 
carry out its activities and consolidate a referential 
presence as a pressure group. “The dynamism 
of social differentiation has been so intense and 
accelerated that the very idea of society has 
begun to be lost.”7
The new political challenge lies in properly 
linking the world of political parties with citizens’ 
organizations. To avoid the ongoing and 
draining rupture between society and politics, 
it is necessary to perfect, through the political 
inclusion of the social movements which speak 
for “direct democracy,” the mechanisms of 
“representative democracy” which are losing 
legitimacy. To stop “the bureaucratization of 
democracy and [to avoid] the bureaucratization 
of social representation,” it is necessary to 
develop a legal body which will enable the 
political regeneration of the parties, but which, 
at the same time, will include organized social 
movements in democratic institutions.8
As the political cannot be reduced to partisan 
structures, and civil society demands participation 
and the opportunity to direct its representatives, 
a new way of organizing “the political” must be 
created, and this new way must seek to integrate 
the new social actors in the mechanisms of 
participation in, deliberation on and decision-
making with regard to public policies.
How do we transform a political democracy with 
a rigid party system that has no possibility of 
containing or representing society into a social 
democracy that seeks to organize representation 
and political work in a new systemic vision?
The path toward this seems to begin with a 
better institutionalization of parties, and an 
acknowledgement of the forms of organization 
taken by a society in its different sectors, indigenous 
identities, and regions. Only a national consensus, 
in which all participate and present hegemonies 
are shunted to the side, can restore meaning to 
politics and make it attractive and credible once 
again in the eyes of the citizenry. Taking the path 
of imposition of a circumstantial majority that 
ignores civil society, or one that seeks absolute 
societal control and quashes all forms of political 
organization, is to continue the vicious cycle of 
antagonistic confrontation that paralyzes and 
drains the energy necessary to design new public 
spaces and build a Nation State that guarantees 
social cohesion.
As Huntington points out, “two groups which 
only consider each other enemies cannot 
constitute the foundation of a community”: they 
do not build a sense of national belonging, they 
do not create a vision of a country, and they do 
not guarantee peaceful, equitable and efficient 
democratic sustainability.
N.B. All quotes are free translations of the 
original texts.
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Turkey’s Search for Identity: A Eurasian and 
Islamic Country
By Ayla Göl
The revival of Islam since 9/11 has often been identified in Western media and political 
discourses as a failure of modernization and the inexorable emergence of fundamentalism 
and terrorism. The role of Islam in Turkish politics cannot be directly related to the rise of 
Islamism in regional and global contexts after 9/11 and the US-led occupation of Iraq. 
Turkey is usually described as a bridge—the so-called bridge theory—between Europe and 
Asia, the West and the (Middle) East or the Western and the Islamic civilizations.1 This 
identification seems logical given the fact that Turkey is geographically located between 
Europe and the Middle East. Historically, Turkey was the first example of the transferring 
of an Islamic empire to a secular nation-state outside Europe in the 1920s. It is also the 
first Muslim country to achieve candidature for European Union (EU) membership in the 
21st century. However, the ongoing debates about Turkey’s membership in the EU have 
brought it to question not only its role as a bridge, but also the Turkish identity, its history 
and culture in the context of European collective history and identity. 
While the so-called “bridge theory” suggests that Turkey acts as a mediator between the 
West and the East, the counter-argument emphasizes Turkey’s role as a geographical barrier 
between Europe and the conflict zones in the Middle East and the Caucasus. According to 
Huntington, rather than a bridge, Turkey has become a “torn” country that “has a single 
predominant culture which places it in one civilization but its leaders want to shift it to 
another civilization.”2 Huntington argues that “a bridge … is an artificial creation connecting 
two solid entities but is part of neither. When Turkey’s leaders term their country a bridge, 
they euphemistically confirm that it is torn.”3 He also identified Australia, Mexico and Russia 
as other torn countries, which are identified by two phenomena. “Their leaders refer to 
them as a ‘bridge’ between two cultures, and observers describe them as Janus-faced. ‘Russia 
looks West—and East’; ‘Turkey: East, West, which is best?’; ‘Australian nationalism: Divided 
loyalties’; are typical headlines highlighting torn country identity problems.”4 In Huntington’s 
opinion, among these states, Turkey is “the classic torn country which since the 1920s has 
been trying to modernize, to Westernize, and to become part of the West.”5 However, the 
Muslim character of Turkish society and the Islamic legacy of the country are not compatible 
with Westernization and modernization. Despite the secular character of the Turkish state, 
Huntington places it in the Islamic civilizational realm when categorizing civilizations of 
the world.6 
This paper challenges Huntington’s “torn” country and “clash of civilizations” thesis by 
arguing that the Turkish historical experience is based on a synthesis rather than a clash of 
competing Islamic and Western civilizations. Turkey is neither a torn country nor a bridge 
between Europe and the Middle East, but a “Eurasian” country that historically combines 
the fundamental characteristics of both the East and the West, geographically connecting 
Europe to Asia. There is no doubt that Turkey’s engagements with the Western model—
characterized by modernization, democratization and secularization—pose a matrix of 
political, religious, cultural and social questions, but this should not be interpreted as 
Islam’s incompatibility with Western civilization. 
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Democracy and Secularization
There is a general tendency—mainly influenced 
by Gellner and Huntington’s arguments—to claim 
that wherever Islam is a powerful societal force, 
as it is in the case of Turkey, there is little success 
in building a modern democratic and secular 
state based on the Western model. This paper 
disagrees with the essentialist understanding 
of Islam in the context of Turkey. It argues that 
Western modernity does not clash with the 
Islamic character of Turkish society. However, the 
universal character of modernity does not imply 
that Turkey’s unique historical and societal factors 
are unimportant. On the contrary, these socio-
historical dimensions are important to explain 
the complexity of a Muslim society’s engagement 
with the West in the context of democratization 
and secularization, which are two sides of the same 
coin. On the one hand, the Turkish experience 
in secularism with its “authoritarian” character 
essentially differs from any other Western society. 
On the other, Turkey is not a fully-fledged 
democracy due to the interference of the military 
in politics and the lack of minority rights. These 
obstacles cannot be attributed to the strength of 
religion but to the existence of a strong state and 
a weak civil society in Turkey. Thus, this paper 
aims to explain how Turkey has produced its own 
synthesis by combining its Islamic and European 
characteristics. 
The first part of the paper will put the alleged 
clash of civilization thesis into question in 
relation to Turkey’s torn country status and 
related identity problems. In the second section, 
I explore what secularism means in Turkey. The 
main assumption is that the claim about a binary 
opposition between the secularism of the Turkish 
state and the Muslim identity of Turkish society is 
misleading in understanding the current political 
developments and protest meetings of 2007. The 
third part of the paper will explain the possibility 
of a Muslim democracy in Turkey by refuting 
Huntington’s claims. Turkey’s experience in 
democratization will be analysed in relation to its 
specific social and historical conditions as well as 
international and regional dynamics. The paper 
concludes by suggesting that Turkey is neither 
a bridge nor a torn country between the two 
civilizations but a unique country, which produced 
its own endogenous “Eurasianism” between two 
geo-cultural and socio-political systems. Such an 
analysis recognizes the possibility of interacting 
civilizational dynamics and “multiple modernities” 
in the world.7
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Turkey as a Torn Country?
Based on his essentialist understanding of Islam 
and unitary conception of civilizational identity, 
Huntington claims that “[a]t some point, 
Turkey could be ready to give up its frustrating 
and humiliating role as a beggar pledging for 
membership in the West and to resume its much 
more impressive and elevated historical role as 
the principal Islamic interlocutor and antagonist 
of the West.”8 According to his thesis, Turkey is 
more likely to turn back to its Islamic identity 
after “having experienced the bad and good 
of the West in secularism and democracy.”9 
As Casanova suggests, “Huntington would 
apparently welcome such a transformation of 
Turkey from a secular to a Muslim state, if only to 
fulfil his own prophecy of the inevitable clash of 
civilisations.”10 However, Huntington’s claims in 
the context of Turkey’s relations with the West are 
historically and geopolitically inaccurate. It seems 
that Huntington is referring to the golden age 
of the Ottoman Empire as the antagonist of the 
West. He fails to acknowledge that the Sublime 
Porte—Bab-i Ali—was geopolitically part of the 
Concert of Europe and had developed close 
relations with the West through war, trade and 
diplomacy since the fifteenth century.
Unlike other post-colonial countries in Asia, Africa, 
Latin America and the Middle East, there is no 
evidence of strong anti-Western feelings in Turkish 
politics. On the contrary, Turkey has always had 
a pro-Western orientation, not only with the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1923, but 
also with the Ottoman modernization policies of 
the nineteenth century. The modern Turkish state 
became the 13th member state of the Council of 
Europe in 1949 and then a member of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952.11 
Thus, Turkey has already secured its membership 
in two key military and cultural organizations 
of the West. Huntington’s claim about Turkey’s 
“humiliating role as a beggar pledging for 
membership in the West” is incorrect unless he 
refers to Turkey’s problematic candidacy for the 
economic organization of European states, the 
EU.12 Turkey’s unsettled membership within the 
EU reflects the political divisions among European 
states in reference to what the European project and 
identity means. More importantly, the European 
states have to reach an agreement on whether 
they recognize Turkey’s place in Europe or not.
According to Huntington’s thesis, there are at least 
three requirements to redefine a torn country’s 
civilizational identity: “First, the political and 
economic elite of the country has to be generally 
supportive of and enthusiastic about this move. 
Second, the public has to be at least willing to 
acquiesce in the redefinition of identity. Third, the 
dominant elements in the host civilization, in most 
cases the West, have to be willing to embrace the 
convert.”13 If we apply these conditions to current 
identity politics in Turkey, there are contradictory 
aspects, which refute Huntington’s claims, as 
manifested in the current protest meetings in the 
name of republicanism and secularism, in April 
and May 2007. 
In relation to his first requirement, the AKP (Adalet 
ve Kalkinma Partisi—Justice and Development 
Party—JDP) government, despite its Islamic roots, 
has not challenged Turkey’s pro-Western direction 
and policies since it took power in November 
2002. If Huntington were right, the AKP would 
give up the previous Turkish governments’ aim 
for Turkey to become a member of the EU and 
redefine its identity as an Islamic state, thus 
acclaiming its Islamic civilization. In Huntington’s 
thesis, it is not very clear how Turkey under the 
AKP government must redefine its civilizational 
identity: is it regarded as part of European or 
Islamic civilization? Huntington argues that 
only the Kemalist-oriented elite wants to be a 
part of the West, while the society itself has a 
different orientation. But a democratically elected 
government clearly represents the political 
will of a society and the AKP’s victory is not an 
exception.
When the AKP came to power, many claimed that 
Islam was on the rise in Turkey. The AKP’s victory 
demonstrated that political Islam was a reaction to 
Turkey’s failed modernization based on Kemalist 
secularism.14 The AKP’s domestic and foreign 
policies, after almost five years in government, 
have not yet shown anti-modernization and 
anti-Western orientations, and, more than any 
previous government, the AKP is determined to 
achieve Turkey’s EU membership. It is usually an 
overlooked fact that the AKP used a populist and 
nationalist discourse in order to win the elections 
in 2002.15 Moreover, the AKP is not the first party 
to play the “Islamic card” in Turkish politics. 
Since 1950, both right wing and religious parties 
have used the religious factor to their own 
ends. The AKP learned from the mistakes of its 
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predecessors: the National Salvation Party (Milli 
Selamet Partisi MSP) under the leadership of 
Necmeddin Erbakan in the 1970s; the Welfare 
Party (Refah Partisi, RP), again under Erbakan’s 
leadership in the 1980s and 1990s; the Virtue 
Party (Fazilet Partisi) and the Felicity Party (Saadet 
Partisi), which were established after the 1997 
post-modern coup. The Virtue Party was closed 
down by the Constitutional Court in 2001 for 
anti-secular activities.16 All these parties clearly 
played the “Islamic card” during the election 
campaigns, but they knew that voters cared more 
about economic issues than religious issues.17 
The former mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, led the reformist group of the Welfare/
Felicity Party to leave the traditionalists and establish 
a new party—the AKP.18 Its leaders emphasized 
the idea of a new and clean (“ak” literally means 
both white and clean in Turkish) leadership that 
was determined to eradicate corruption from the 
state system. Many voters wanted to get rid of the 
old leadership and two thirds of them had never 
voted for Islamist parties before. The crucial factor 
was the economic crisis of 2001, which led the 
voters to try out a new party and its promising 
leadership. While the AKP introduced new blood 
into politics, the majority of its voters were enticed 
by economic and social problems rather than 
the party’s views on religion. For instance, the 
most controversial headscarf issue was in eighth 
place—way below more significant concerns 
about the economy, corruption and joining the 
EU. The AKP leaders not only used a very clever 
mix of modernity and tradition, but also aimed 
to attract different sections of the society. The 
AKP continues to operate within the structure of 
the existing political system and to use an even 
stronger nationalist discourse for the early election 
campaigns in the summer of 2007.
According to the second requirement of Hunting-
ton’s torn country claim, the redefinition of a civi-
lizational identity takes place reluctantly without 
protests. The political tension between Kemalist 
secularists and the AK Party government has been 
highlighted by the presidential candidacy of the 
current foreign minister Abdullah Gül, who is ac-
cused of having a hidden Islamist agenda. The 
protest meetings of secularists—described as the 
Republic Protests (Cumhuriyet Mitingleri)—which 
took place in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir most re-
cently between 14 April and 20 May, 2007, were 
the first example of their kind in Turkish history 
and they challenge Huntington’s claims. He ar-
gued that “Turkey may be equally qualified to 
lead Islam. But to do so it would have to reject 
Ataturk’s legacy more thoroughly than Russia has 
rejected Lenin’s.”19 Recent protest meetings prove 
him wrong: Many demonstrators carried pictures 
of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Turkish flags while 
chanting slogans to express their determination 
to protect secularism and republicanism as the 
main principles of Kemalism.20 These peaceful 
mass rallies clearly demonstrated the determina-
tion of the people to protect Ataturk’s legacy and 
support the country’s secular system against any 
Islamic agenda.
These events had been the strongest manifestation 
of the acceptance of secular identity by a broad 
spectrum of Turkish society. Although there are 
controversial debates about which groups—
in particular the army or retired members of 
the Turkish military forces— were involved in 
organizing these meetings, there is no doubt 
that millions of people were mobilized and they 
were strongly supported by NGOs, in particular, 
women’s civil society organizations.21 
It is also important to note that the secularist 
demonstrators criticized the role of the army 
in Turkish politics as well as the hidden Islamic 
agenda of the AKP government. For these people, 
neither a military coup nor an Islamic state—
Shari’a—is desirable for Turkish democracy.22 
The problem is not Islam itself, but the use of 
religion and religious identity, demonstrated 
by the presidential candidacy in state affairs. 
It is not easy to decide to what extent these 
claims are valid. If we accept that modernity is 
inherently creative, than it is, consequently, never 
a completed process. As such, the AKP’s tenure 
in power is clearly not aimed at Islamizing state 
institutions but at creating a sense of identity to 
move attention away from state and high politics, 
which disguise the agency of the public sphere. 
The fears of Islam and the alleged hidden agenda 
of the AKP seem to be exaggerated.
Consequently, the AKP’s use of state power for its 
own ends, with the support of Muslim bourgeoisie, 
media and the discourse of nationalism, created 
a new cycle within which the secularists are 
politically constructed as the new reactionaries. 
This group perceive that their secular identity 
and daily life style, such as the freedom to drink 
alcohol, wear non-religious clothing—from mini 
skirts to bikinis and not wearing head scarves, 
as well as women being able to hold a driving 21
licence—is threatened by the AKP’s envisaged 
Islamic identity. In this case, one can argue that 
secularism in Turkey has moved beyond a state 
project and become a social phenomenon. This 
challenges not only Huntington’s claims but also 
the classic textbook explanations about Turkish 
secularism: there is a tension between the secular 
character of the state and the Islamic identity of 
the society. On the contrary, recent developments 
prove that there is a tension between the Islamic 
agenda of the AKP government and the secular 
character of the Turkish society. 
Huntington’s third requirement of the redefinition 
of a civilizational identity is probably the most 
acceptable and relevant claim. Turkey, with 
its secularized state institutions and society, 
represents a convergence, not a clash, between 
Eastern and Western civilizations. Nevertheless, 
the acid test is whether the host civilization—
the West—will recognize such a convergence. 
As Huntington puts it “[…] the West, have to 
be willing to embrace the convert.”23 Although 
Huntington is right to identify the West—i.e, 
member states of the EU—as representative of 
the host civilization, his description of Turkey as 
a “convert” is misleading. Moreover, “the view 
from inside Turkey attests that Huntingon’s picture 
is a mere caricature of Turkey’s political realities. 
Certainly, there is—as in all EU member-states—a 
broad coalition of EU sceptics.”24 Even if Turkey 
does not become a member of the EU in the near 
future, the possibility of turning itself to an Islamic 
state seems to be a preposterous suggestion. 
Huntington does not recognize that the historical 
processes of secularization and democratization 
have also begun in Turkey, as evidenced by the 
pro-Western choices of its leaders.
The Turkish experience proves that democratic 
institutions can take hold in a Muslim society 
where religion and politics are separated. 
Whether European states will acknowledge the 
diversity of Turkey with its five-times-a-day calls 
to prayer and Eurasian identity, depends on how 
they define “Western civilization.” Most probably, 
Turkey is not European enough to be accepted 
as part of the West. Similarly, due to its secular 
character, Turkey is not Islamic enough to be 
regarded as part of the Muslim world. Therefore, 
the next section explores what secularism means 
in Turkish politics. 
Secularism as a Social 
Phenomenon
It is a historical fact that Turkey is the first secular 
state in the Muslim world. Gellner and Huntington’s 
claims can be identified as the most influential 
theses of secularization and modernization. 
According to Gellner, Muslim societies cannot 
be secularized since Islam as a religion displays 
unique characteristics which are resistant to 
modernity and secularization.25 Furthermore, 
“secularisation and democratisation have been 
often considered mutually reinforcing processes” 
in modernization theories.26 If we focus on the 
secularization thesis first, the separation between 
religion and politics takes place in societies 
through the development of modernization, 
industrialization and rationalization. 
Many views on the incompatibility of Islam, 
secularism and democracy are generally based 
on an essentialist as well as an Orientalist view 
of Islam.27 In this view, Islam is portrayed as a 
unified homogenous phenomenon, which is 
incompatible with European modernity and 
its essential characteristics of secularism and 
democracy. This view does not acknowledge that 
there are different interpretations and political 
trajectories of Islam, ranging widely from Algeria, 
Morocco via Turkey to Indonesia and Malaysia. 
More importantly, the lack of democracy in many 
developing countries in Latin America, Africa 
and Asia cannot be attributed to the strength 
of Islam, as there are different belief systems in 
these countries.
In reference to secularization and Islam, it is im-
portant to make a differentiation between a sepa-
ration of religion and state (din wa dawla) and 
that of religion and politics (din wa siyasa). Tur-
key’s experience in secularization is described as 
laïcité (laiklik),28 “based on the principles of posi-
tivist secularism that was modelled after French 
republican laïcité, Jacobin statism, and vanguard 
elitism.”29 In its classic definition, “secularization 
refers to the divorce of public affairs, including 
law and education, from religion.”30 Therefore, 
there is a clear separation between religion and 
state institutions, but not necessarily between re-
ligion and politics. 
It is usually claimed that the founders of the 
Turkish republic achieved the separation 
between religion and state in an “authoritarian” 
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way.31 However, religion was placed under 
the control of the state, rather than a distinct 
separation being made between the two. The 
abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 instigated 
the institutionalization of cutting ties with Islam, 
which represented tradition, irrationality and the 
backwardness of the Ottoman Empire. In the 
same year, the closure of Holy Places, banning 
of Dervish orders and the establishment of the 
Directorate for Religious Affairs were carried out 
as part of this revolutionary transition. Islamic 
authority, practice and knowledge were tightly 
included rather than excluded under the strict 
control of the secular state, which controlled the 
public visibility of Islam. The banning of the veil 
and the fez (the latter was banned in the Hat Law 
of 1925) was an attempt to project an image 
of civilization during the founding years of the 
Republic. Indeed, a raft of other measures such 
as the imposition of the Gregorian calendar, the 
introduction of a Western Penal Code as well as the 
replacement of Arabic script with a Latin alphabet 
in 1928 and a Turkish translation of the Koran 
from Arabic (with the call to prayer—ezan—sung 
in Turkish) were all implemented to reinforce the 
visibility and symbolic omnipotence of a secular 
way of life.32 These reforms, to a certain extent, 
reflected the competing representations of 
tradition and modernity, Islam and secularism. 
Consequently, Turkey’s particularly unique 
experience of secularism was criticized for putting 
religious affairs under the direct control of state 
institutions, rather than the common pattern in 
the West, where all religious affairs are separated 
from formal political affairs. This process has two 
important repercussions: first, Turkish secularism 
produced “a ruling administrative military-civilian 
bureaucratic elite with a distinct identity as ‘laik 
Turks,’ separate from ordinary backward Muslim 
subjects”; second, Islam is perceived as a threat to 
the secular character of the state, which produced 
“the ideology of a national security state with an 
exclusionary code of violence.”33 
However, the main problem with this analysis 
is that it assumes a strong tension between 
the implemented secularism of the state and 
the repressed Islam of Turkish society. For 
this understanding, it is the very nature of the 
secularization project as an imposition from 
above that contributed towards the politicization 
of Islam. The control of religion by the state led to 
the repression of Islam, which has been regarded 
as “reactionary” because of its subversive potential 
by the Republicans. Not only are the binary 
oppositions of state and society, public and private, 
inherently problematic, but the assumption that 
secularism remains as a state project is also deeply 
problematic. Such an understanding does not 
acknowledge the possibility of turning a secular 
project into a social phenomenon and historical 
process that penetrates into the different layers of 
the Turkish society. 
In particular, the sheer support of the public 
to the recent Republican mass rallies can be 
interpreted as a sign of the Turkish people’s 
acceptance of secularism. To be more specific, 
a counter-model of the Turkish secular state 
would be an Islamic state where the legal system 
is based on Islamic law (Shari’a). According to 
the Gallup’s World Poll Special Report on the 
Muslim World in 2006, Turkey is the only country, 
“where 57% say Shari’a should not be a source 
of legislation, not surprising for a country whose 
constitution explicitly limits the role of religion 
in the governmental sphere.”34 Interestingly, 
Lebanon comes in second at 33% and Indonesia 
is third at 18 %. Iran is fourth with 14%, although 
66% support the idea that “Shari’a must be a 
source of legislation but not the only source.” 
This percentage is 23% in Turkey (Gallup, p. 2) 
Only 12% of Turkish people support the idea of 
an Islamic state by accepting Shari’a as the only 
source of legislation.35 
Two polar opposite trends—the militant secularist 
vs. the radical Islamist—do not represent the 
majority of Turkish society’s views on secularism. 
One can argue that laïcité (laiklik) has established 
itself in important areas of both the state and 
society, “largely due to the power resources 
available to the secular state apparatus”—in 
particular legal and educational systems—as 
well as its international connections.36 The AKP’s 
electoral victory has been wrongly interpreted 
as the rise of Islamism in Turkish public affairs. 
Many observers interpreted it as meaning that the 
previous bastion of secularism in the Muslim world 
was endangered.37 The secularist demonstrations 
of 2007 proved that these observers were wrong. 
Similarly, the secularist demonstrators criticized 
the army’s interference in state affairs, which is 
also an important indication of current political 
developments. 
The Turkish experience demonstrates that 
secularism and democratization are two sides 
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of the same coin. They mutually constitute 
and reinforce each other. However, the recent 
developments in Turkey reveal the contested 
nature of a paradoxical relationship between 
secularization and democratization. On the 
one hand, secularization is seen as an essential 
prerequisite of democratization, and on the other, 
Turkey’s relative progress in democratization 
is also associated with its authoritarian state 
secularism. There is a paradoxical partnership 
between secularism and democratization in Turkey 
due to the role of the army in this relationship, 
which raises the question: can there be a Muslim 
democracy?
Turkey as a Muslim Democracy
Despite the fact that Turkey has sustained 
democracy since 1946, and that it is the only 
democratic Muslim country, not only in the 
Middle East but also the Muslim world, it is not 
recognized as a democratic state by Freedom 
House.38 According to this US-based international 
think tank, Israel stands out as the only democracy 
in the Middle East, despite also being classified as 
the least democratic region in the world. Based 
on these assumptions, the essentialist view of 
Islam concludes that the “democracy deficit” 
in the Middle East is a consequence of religious 
or cultural obstacles.39 It is either Islam or Arab 
culture or both that obstructs democratization in 
the region. 
According to research by Alfred Stephan, in 
the 47 countries with an Islamic majority, 11 
(23%) countries have democratically elected 
governments.40 This situation deserves very 
careful consideration of the underlying historical, 
socio-economic and international factors—such 
as colonialism, underdevelopment, illiteracy 
and poverty—rather than explaining it as “Arab 
exceptionalism.”
The Turkish engagement in the establishment and 
consolidation of democracy in spite of its own 
“fault lines” has differed from those of both devel-
oping Western states, most developing countries, 
as well as Arab states of the Middle East.41 Many 
scholars argue that democracy took root in Tur-
key only after Islam was excluded from the public 
realm in the early years of the Republic.42 Howev-
er, the recent history of Turkey demonstrates that 
democracy has been consolidated by the gradual 
inclusion of Islam into politics “while constitution-
al and legal secularism have been kept intact.”43 
This is the key to understanding the causes of the 
recent public demonstrations: to protect constitu-
tional and legal secularism via democratic mecha-
nisms in Turkey. 
There had been a strong state tradition in Ot-
toman/Turkish history, and this tradition remains 
as the main obstacle of the Turkish transition to 
democracy. The rigid control of the public sphere 
by the state was the dominant character of Turk-
ish politics between 1923 and 1946 under sin-
gle-party rule (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – Ataturk’s 
Republican Peoples Party). A multi-party system 
began after the first victory of an opposition par-
ty (Democrat Party) in 1950. State power soft-
ened gradually throughout the 1950s and the 
1960s while the global liberalization policies of 
the 1980s and 1990s introduced new conditions 
for democratization. Meanwhile, Turkish democ-
racy was interrupted by three direct and two 
indirect military interventions in politics44: three 
direct military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980, 
and then a post-modern/soft coup in 1997, 
followed by indirect interference in the recent 
presidential candidacy in April 2007. The Turkish 
Armed Forces act as the self-appointed guardians 
of the secular state system. “In its self-appointed 
role as the ‘guardian of the unitary, secular state, 
the military occupies the paradoxical position of 
‘safeguarding’ democracy while at the same time 
posing a major challenge to further democrati-
sation.”45 Well-trained Turkish generals must be 
well aware of the fact that there is no place for a 
strong army in a fully democratic Turkey.
One can argue that there is almost a tradition of 
military intervention in every decade since Tur-
key’s advance to a multi-party system. However, 
direct military rule has been the exception rather 
than a constant rule in Turkish politics since 1960. 
There is a paradox here: the army interferes as 
the guardian of secularism and each military in-
tervention seriously harms democratization pro-
cesses by pushing the country’s democratic ad-
vance back at least 10 years. It sounds like the 
famous Turkish march—two steps forward and 
one step backwards. Furthermore, military in-
terference also produced a unique military-state 
elite and mentality which utilized religion, when 
necessary, according to its own understanding 
and needs. 
As Feroz Ahmad argues, the paradoxical role 
of the military particularly contributed to the 
politicization of Islam after the 1980 coup and 
24
religion has become an instrument of social 
control.46 Within the cold war mentality, the 
atheist communist threat from the Soviet 
block was framed as the main threat to Turkish 
security. The generals of the 1980 coup blamed 
this communist threat for the ideological and 
violent street struggles between left and the 
right wing youngsters. The solution was found 
in the so-called “Turkish-Islamic synthesis,” 
which was originally theorized by intellectuals 
(Aydinlar Ocagi—Intellectuals’ House) of the 
right. It “became the quasi-official ideology of 
the military regime. Based on the typical fascist 
troïka of “barracks, mosque and family,” the 
Turkish-Islamic synthesis was geared to bring 
the rebellious youth back into the fold of the 
establishment through emphasizing obedience 
to authority and fear of God.”47 Although this 
semi-religious, semi-military nationalism did not 
function as the generals expected, this mentality 
led the state elite and the establishment to turn a 
blind eye to growing religious organizations and 
sentiments during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
increasing visibility of Islam in the public sphere 
in the 2000s only makes sense within these socio-
historical conditions. 
The AKP won the election in 2002 because 
it had embraced the rules of the only game 
in town—democracy—and recognized the 
legitimacy of the army as the guardian of 
secularism. Although the relationship between 
secularism and democratization appears to be 
paradoxical in the Turkish context it still proves 
that “Muslim democracy is as possible and viable 
today in Turkey as Christian democracy was half 
a century ago in Western Europe.”48 While Turkey 
is less advanced than Europe, it is relatively more 
advanced in democratization than other Middle 
Eastern countries. The following historical, socio-
economic and international explanations will 
help us to understand Turkey’s exceptionalism:
i. Historical explanation: Turkey, of all the 
Muslim countries has had the longest 
engagement with democracy. In accordance 
with the modernization policies of the 
Ottoman Empire, Turks were introduced to 
the idea of a constitutional parliamentary 
regime first between December 1876 and 
February 1878 and second, between July 
1908 and January 1913. Therefore, the Turkish 
experiment in parliamentary democracy did 
not commence with the establishment of the 
Republic in the 1920s, but has been going 
on for more than a century, the longest 
experience in the Muslim world. “In Turkey, 
democratic institutions were neither imposed 
by the victors, as happened in the defeated 
Axis countries, nor bequeathed by departing 
imperialists, as happened in the former 
British and French dependencies, but were 
introduced by the free choice of the Turks 
themselves. This surely gave these institutions 
a much better chance of survival.”49 Turks 
under the Ottoman Empire were part the 
ruling elite and had never been directly 
colonized. It was an endogenous movement, 
not an exogenous one, as experienced in 
many post-colonial contexts. Nevertheless, 
this cannot be the only explanation, given 
the fact that Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and 
Iran, like Turkey, never experienced direct 
colonial rule except for some interruptions 
of foreign rule in their histories. Moreover, 
in comparison to these countries, Turkey is 
also more advanced in nation-state building, 
which leads us to other socio-economic 
factors. 
ii. Socio-economic explanation: The Ottoman 
Empire’s close relations with the European 
states triggered a specific form of socio-
economic and political change since the 
mid-nineteenth century. Its progress in de-
mocratization in the 20th and 21st centuries 
undoubtedly rests on this socio-historical ex-
perience. The empire’s modernization policies 
also contributed to economic changes, which 
produced a professional, technical, manage-
rial and entrepreneurial middle class. The es-
tablishment of the Turkish Republic not only 
established a secular nation-state but also con-
solidated a national market economy. Many 
observers have attached great importance to 
Turkey’s economic development, which was 
not related to its natural revenues, unlike oth-
er oil-rich Muslim countries.50 Turkey is not a 
rentier state. Turkey’s economic growth was a 
consequence of its participation in the capital-
ist market economy. As described by Lipset, 
the proverb “No taxation, no representation” 
makes clear sense in understanding the rela-
tionship between economic development and 
democratization in Muslim societies.51 In oil-
rich countries of the Middle East, citizens of a 
state usually do not have a voice in decision-
making as long as the state provides the ba-
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sic services and satisfies public needs, such as 
jobs, health care and housing. In return, the 
oil-rich states do not need taxes to finance 
these services. In the Turkish context, the state 
cannot depend on its oil revenues and there-
fore, taxation and representation mutually re-
inforce each other on the path to democrati-
zation.
iii. International dimension: Turkey has had the 
longest geopolitical and closest diplomatic 
relations with the West, dating back almost 
to the fifteenth century. The Ottoman 
Empire’s problematic existence within 
the Concert of Europe was resolved with 
modern Turkey’s firm commitment to pro-
Western alignment through its NATO and 
European Council membership as well as its 
EU candidacy. Thus, as stated earlier, there 
is not a strong sense of “anti-Westernism” 
in Turkish politics. Turkey has become one 
of the closest allies of the USA and Israel in 
the Middle East, which reflects the secular 
character of its foreign policies. Neither the 
American nor the Israeli governments have 
criticized the role of a strong army in Turkish 
politics while establishing close security and 
defence relations. It is through Turkey’s EU 
membership that the role of the army has 
been criticized. As Ilter Turan identifies, “the 
EU has been critical of Turkey in three broad 
areas: the restricted nature of civil liberties, 
the insufficient protection of minorities and 
the unusual political influence of the Turkish 
military.”52 Therefore, it is difficult to decide 
whether the army usually returns to barracks 
because of their dedication to democracy or 
whether the “international factor” indirectly 
forces them to hand power to civilians. Clearly, 
the key obstacle to Turkey’s consolidation 
of democracy is not the strength of Islam 
but the existence of a strong state tradition 
and the paradoxical role of the army as the 
guardian of secularism. The answer lies in the 
rise of civil society to balance state power and 
resolve its poor record of human rights.
 
All these historical, socio-economic and 
international factors created a specific political 
culture, within which democratic values and 
institutions have gradually been synthesized in 
the social context of Turkey. The current AKP 
government, despite its Islamic roots, is identified 
as the most democratic government and an 
example of Muslim democracy. Ironically, the 
AKP leaders have never described themselves 
as “Muslim democrats” but as “conservative 
democrats.”53 The rise of the AKP as the continuity 
of its predecessors can only make sense within the 
specific historical and socio-economic conditions 
of Turkish domestic and international policies. The 
rise of Islam in the Turkish public sphere cannot 
be interpreted “as a deviation from the country’s 
modernization process” but as a product of 
modernity.54 The AKP leaders have not changed 
Turkey’s pro-Western policies but have achieved 
the greatest political reforms in order to gain 
Turkey’s EU membership. 
Turkish leaders must cease reducing its European 
credentials to membership and identity issues. The 
political discourses of the current AKP government 
as well as the previous governments give the 
impression that EU membership is regarded as 
“the ultimate mark of being European.”55 In the 
21st century, it is time to change this mentality 
and it is not Turkey that is suffering from an 
identity crisis, but Europe. 
The public debates in Europe over Turkey’s admis-
sion have shown that Europe is actually the torn 
country, deeply divided over its cultural identity, 
unable to answer the question of whether Euro-
pean identity, and, thus its external and internal 
boundaries, should be defined by the common 
heritage of Christianity and Western civilization or 
by its modern secular values of liberalism, univer-
sal human rights, political democracy, and tolerant 
and inclusive multiculturalism. Publicly, of course, 
European liberal secular elites cannot share the 
Pope’s definition of European civilization as essen-
tially Christian. But they also cannot verbalize the 
unspoken “cultural” requirements that make the 
integration of Turkey into Europe such a difficult 
issue.56
It would be easier for both sides if Turkey’s 
Eurasian identity were recognized geo-culturally. 
As a former foreign minister (1997-2002), Ismail 
Cem argued, successive Turkish governments 
have failed to define Turkey’s identity in reference 
to “Avrasya” (Eurasia) by presenting Turkey 
as sharing the European collective identity.57 
Turkey’s insistence on its European-ness has 
been counter-productive on two accounts: it 
creates a false consciousness about its identity as 
“non-European”—“Islamic” and leads to a futile 
resistance of its “Asian-ness.” Turkey culturally 
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shares more characteristics with Central Asia than 
the Arab Middle East and it also has historical 
relations with European countries. 
For European states, it will be relatively easier 
to accommodate Turks in a multi-cultural EU 
when Turkey’s Eurasian identity is promoted. 
Economically, the EU can also benefit from 
Turkey’s energy corridors via the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzurum gas 
pipeline. Turkey’s EU membership will open 
Central Asian markets to Europe, which has a 
vested interest in expanding its commercial 
relations and influencing their socio-political 
developments towards plural democracy. Within 
the Cold War mentality, Turkish policy makers 
refrained from formulating policies that would 
reflect Turkey’s “Eurasian-ness.” In the post-Cold 
War era, Turkey is perhaps the best candidate to 
realize the need for “Euro-Asian” dialogue. Such 
a dialogue challenges not only Huntington’s 
thesis but also the existing American hegemony 
in regional and global contexts.
Concluding Remarks
Turkey is the first historical example of a “secular” 
‘Muslim democracy’ in the Islamic World. Turkey’s 
unique experience shows that it is neither a bridge 
nor a torn country. Twenty-first century Turkey 
must geopolitically redefine its endogenous 
Eurasian identity. Its spatial existence in Europe 
and Asia is enhanced by the combination of 
its temporal experience of Western and Islamic 
civilizations. As Casanova suggests, “the 
contemporary transformation of Muslim politics 
in Turkey offers perhaps the best illustration of 
Muslim democratization and the most compelling 
refutation of Huntington’s thesis.”58 The recent 
demonstration movements exhibit that Ataturk’s 
legacy and secularism remain as part of Turkish 
political culture. It is a historical fact that Turkey 
has created its own modernity by synthesizing 
Islam with contemporary Western secularism 
and liberal democracy. The Turkish experience 
also proves the possibility of turning secularism 
from a state project imposed from above into an 
evolving social phenomenon. However, it is now 
the West’s turn to recognize Turkey’s western 
credentials and Eurasian identity with its unique 
historical experience. Eurocrats in Brussels must 
realize that Turkey’s EU membership will promote 
the idea of “unity in diversity” rather than clash 
of civilizations.  
FOOTNOTES
1  Mumtaz Soysal, “The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy,” in 
Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, eds, The Future of 
Turkish Foreign Policy, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2004, p. 
38; Ismail Cem, Turkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya, Vol. 1, Istanbul, 
Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari, 2004, pp. 69-70.
2  Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World Order, Simon and Schuster Inc., New 
York: 1996, p. 138.
3  Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 149.
4  Ibid., p. 139 (Emphasis is mine).
5  Ibid., p. 138.
6  Ibid., See Map 1.3, p. 27.
7  S.E. Eisenstadt “Multiple Modernities,” Daedalus, Vol. 
129, No. 1, (Winter 2000), pp. 1-29; Goeran Therborn, 
“Entangled Modernities,” European Journal of Social 
Theory, Vol.6, No.3 (2003), pp. 293-305; Peter J. 
Katzenstein, “Multiple Modernities as Limits to Secular 
Europeanization?,” in Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J 
Katzenstein (eds.), Religion in an Expanding Europe, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
8  Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 178.
9  Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 179.
10  Jose Casanova, “Catholic and Muslim Politics in 
Comparative Perspective,” Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 
Vol. 1, No.2 (December 2005), p. 102.
11 Oliver Roy, “Turkey: a World Apart, Or Europe’s new 
Frontier?,” in Olivier Roy, ed., Turkey Today: A European 
Country?, London, Anthem Press, 2005, p. 11.
12 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 178.
13 Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, p. 139; Casanova, 
“Catholic and Muslim Politics,” p. 102.
14 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (Father of Turks) is considered the 
founder of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923. The 
followers of his ideas are described as Kemalist, while the 
state ideology is described as Kemalism—based on the six 
principles of republicanism (cumhuriyetcilik), nationalism 
(milliyetcilik), secularism (laiklik), statism (devletcilik), 
populism (halkcilik) and reformism (devrimcilik), which 
were first identified as the main principles of Ataturkism 
(Ataturkculuk) and then codified in the Fourth Congress of 
the People’s Republican Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) in 
1935.
15 It is a point worth emphasizing: the AKP had 35% of 
votes but 65% of the parliament due to the current 
political system, which has a 10% electoral threshold for 
representation in the Turkish Parliament.
16 Dunden Bugune Anayasa Mahkemesi: 1962-2007, 45. Yil 
Albumu, 2007, p. 177-178, www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/
loaded/pdf_dosyalari/mahkeme/dundenbuguneaym.pdf 
(Accessed on 7 July 2007)
17 Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” Turkish 
Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2005), pp. 171-173
18  Senem Aydin and Rusen Cakir, Political Islam in Turkey, 
Centre for European Policy Studies Working Document 
No. 265, April 2007, p. 1
19  Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, p. 179
20  “Ankara’da Tarihi Cumhuriyet Mitingi,” NtvMsnbc News, 
16 Nisan 2007, www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/405418.
asp; “Cumhuriyet Mitingleri Izmir, Manisa ve 
Canakkale’de,” Radikal, 2 May, 2007, www.radikal.com.
tr/haber.php?haberno=220043; “29 Nisan Cumhuriyet 
Mitingi,” YouTube Video, See www.youtube.com/
watch?v=EdKlIlpnR9o (Accessed on 9 July, 2007).
21 Samsun’da Cumhuriyet Mitingi, BBC Turkish Service,
 20 May, 2007;
 www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2007/05/070520_
turkey_update.shtml (Accessed on 10 June, 2007)
27
22  Samsun’da Miting Coskusu, CCN Turk, 20 May, 2007; 
www.cnnturk.com/TURKIYE/haber_detay.asp?PID=318&h
aberID=349478 (Accessed on 10 June, 2007)
23 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 139.
24 Dietrich Jung, Turkey’s Future: EU Member of ‘Islamist 
Rouge State’?, Danish Institute for International Studies 
Brief, DIIS: Copenhagen, January 2007, p. 3.
25 Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1981.
26 Majid Tehranian, “Disenchanted Worlds: Secularisation 
and Democratisation in the Middle East,” in Amin Saikal 
and Albrecth Schnabel, eds., Democratisation in the 
Middle East: Experiences, Struggles, Challenges, Tokyo, 
United Nations University Press, 2003, p. 81.
27 Abdou Filali-Ansary, “Muslims and Democracy,” in Larry 
Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Daniel Brumberg, eds, 
Islam and Democracy in the Middle East, Baltimore, The 
John Hopkins University Press, 2003, pp. 193-207.
28 There is no equivalent word in either Arabic or Turkish 
to describe the separation between religion and politics. 
Laiklik in Turkish is clearly derived from the French word 
laïcité.
29 Casanova, “Catholic and Muslim Politics,” pp. 102-3.
30 Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” Turkish 
Studies, Vol. 6, No: 2 (June 2005), p. 168.
31 Nilufer Gole, “Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist 
Politics: the Case of Turkey,” in Civil Society in the Middle 
East, A. G. Richard, ed., vol. 2, Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 
1996.
32 Toktamı Ate, Dünyada ve Türkiye’de Laiklik, Ankara, Ümit 
Yayıncılık, 10th edition, 2000, pp. 120-125.
33 Casanova, “Catholic and Muslim Politics,” p. 103.
34 Gallup World Poll, Special Report: Muslim World, Islam and 
Democracy, Princeton, Gallup Organization, 2006, p. 2. 
http://media.gallup.com/WorldPoll/PDF/GALLUPMUSLIM
STUDIESIslamandDemocracy030607.pdf (Accessed on 7 
July, 2007)
35  Ibid.
36  P. W. Sutton and S. Vertigans, “The Established and 
Challenging Outsiders: Resurgent Islam in Secular Turkey,” 
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, vol. 3, no. 
1 (Summer 2002), p. 64.
37  Jung, Turkey’s Future, p. 5.
38  Daniel Brumberg and Larry Diamond, “Introduction,” in 
Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Daniel Brumberg, eds, 
Islam and Democracy in the Middle East, Baltimore, The 
John Hopkins University Press, 2003, pp.x-xii; Freedom in 
the World, www.freedomhouse.org (Accessed on 15 May, 
2007).
39  Manus I Midlarsky, “Democracy and Islam: Implications 
for Civilisational Conflict and Democratic Peace,” 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 3 (September 
1998), pp. 485-511; Alfred C. Stepan, “Arab, not Muslim, 
Exceptionalism,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 4 
(2004), pp. 140-146.
40  Alfred C. Stepan, “An Arab More than a Muslim Electoral 
Gap,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2003), pp. 30-
44.
41  Toprak, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” p. 171.
42  See Serif Mardin, “Religion in Modern Turkey,” International 
Social Sciences Journal, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1977), p. 279; 
Bernard Lewis, “Islamic Revival in Turkey,” International 
Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January 1952, p. 46; E. Shakman 
Hurd, “Negotiating Europe: The Politics of Religion and the 
Prospects for Turkish Accession,” Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 32 (2006), pp. 401-418.
43  Metin Heper, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward 
a Reconciliation?”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, No.1, 
Winter 1997, p. 33.
44  Göle, op. cit., p. 49.
45  Toprak, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” p. 179.
46  Feroz Ahmad, “Islamic Reassertion in Turkey,” Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2 (April 1988), p. 757.
47  Toprak, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” p. 179.
48  Casanova, “Catholic and Muslim Politics,” p. 103.
49  Bernard Lewis, “Why Turkey is the Only Muslim 
democracy?”, Middle East Quarterly, March 1994, p. 5; 
Also available at www.meforum.org/article/216 (Accessed 
on 31 May, 2007).
50  Hootan Shambayati, “The Rentier State, Interest Groups, 
and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in 
Turkey and Iran,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 26, No. 3 
(April 1994), pp. 307-331.
51  Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of 
Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy,” The American Political Science Review, 53 
(March 1959), pp. 69-105.
52  Ilter Turan, “Unstable stability: Turkish politics at the 
crossroads?” International Affairs, Vol. 83, No: 2 (2007),
 p. 328.
53  Cuneyt Ulsever, “An Analysis of the AKP,” Turkish Daily 
News, 26 May, 2007, www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/
article.php?enewsid=74056 (Accessed on 30 May, 2007); 
See AK Party Official Web Site at eng.akparti.org.tr/english/
chairman.html (Accessed on 10 July, 2007).
54  Jung, Turkey’s Future, p. 5.
55  John Redmond, “Turkey and the European Union: troubled 
European or European trouble?,” International Affairs, Vol. 
83, No. 2 (2007), p. 315.
56  Jose Casanova, “The Long, Difficult, and Tortuous Journey 
of Turkey into Europe and the Dilemmas of European 
Civilisation,” Constellations, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), 
 p. 241.
57  Cem, Turkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya, op. cit., p. 7; Ismail 
Cem, “Turkey and Europe: Looking to the Future from 
a Historical Perspective.” www.mfa.gov.tr (Accessed on
 23 June, 2007).
58  Casanova, “Catholic and Muslim Politics,” p. 102.
28
Civil Society and the National Human Rights 
Commission in the Republic of Korea
By Byunghoon Oh
The countries of the East Asian region have shared the political culture of authoritarianism 
for most of their histories. Since the 1980s, many efforts to overcome the authoritarian 
system have been made in several countries, but it is said that the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) is recognized as the only country in the region to have followed the best practice of 
economic growth and democracy. This paper will discuss the following questions regarding 
democratization in the ROK: 
-  How was authoritarianism overcome and has a democratic political order been 
established?  
-  What are the characteristics and roles of the civil society movement in the process of 
democratization since 1987?
-  What is the role of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea in fulfilling its 
mandate to eliminate the authoritarian political system?
For this discussion, I will focus on the institutional aspects of democratization, drawing on 
South Korea’s practical debates and experiences. That is, how can we establish democracy 
as an institution in our lives at the grassroots level? What matters is that it will take time for 
the institutionalization of democracy to take root through trial and error. In the Korean case, 
the kind of resistance faced by the despotic power of the authoritarian political system, 
and the kind of negotiation that brought about the establishment of an independent 
national human rights body are key to understanding the democratization process.
The Origin and Characteristics of Authoritarian Political Culture 
Korean society is rooted in Confucianism, which was a philosophical mechanism 
contributing to the mind-set of elites during the Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910). Many other 
East Asian countries had this philosophical background in common in their histories.
Even though many scholars blame this historical background for the rise of authoritarianism 
in Korean society, the critical point for the development of a vicious authoritarian mindset 
came from Japanese imperialism or militarism, which eradicated the civilian ruling 
system that was beginning to sprout. After liberation from Japanese imperialism, military 
despotism and anti-communist ideology were prevalent until the middle of the 1980s in 
Korea. The rulers produced and manipulated this ideology in order to impede the progress 
of democracy. 
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Democracy, Citizenship and
Civil Society
Advent and Characteristics of
Civil Society 
1. Advent of Civil Society in Korea
As in other countries, civil society in Korea 
has played an important role as a protago-
nist of democratization. Civil society fought 
against authoritarian, coercive and monopo-
listic military despotism in the process of de-
mocratization, then secured itself an auton-
omous space separate from state authority. 
The democratization movement in 1987 was 
an important event for developing democ-
racy in Korea. At this time, the civil move-
ment was at the centre of very militant, radi-
cal anti-governmental drive. Since then, the 
civil society campaign has been legalized and 
popularized. Now that various actors lead 
the movement, the influence of civil society 
is prevailing nationwide.
The civil society of Korea has attained growth 
in both quantity and quality. Currently, civil 
society is seeking to change its strategy to 
adapt to an autonomous and pluralistic 
society that contrasts with its roots in the 
violent and coercive epoch of the despotic 
regime. It also seeks to build a cooperative 
relationship with the state. In the relationship 
between civil society and the state, civil society 
needs to develop a cooperative network for 
mutual negotiation in order to contribute 
to the development of democracy, while at 
the same time remaining separate from the 
power structure. 
2. The Change in the Nature of
 Civil Society
The civil society movement in 1987 provided 
a critical push for democratization in Korean 
society by combining the explosive power of 
the labour and student movements. Since that 
time, it has changed its strategy from mass 
mobilization to lawsuits, policy presentation, 
handling of civil complaints, etc.
The civil rights movement was enriched by the 
participation of NGOs equipped with human 
rights expertise. They focused on human 
rights violations caused by political power, 
capital, governmental bodies, bureaucracy, 
private bodies and even personal relations. 
Strategic changes have occurred, especially 
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with respect to the relationship between 
the civil society and the government. Even 
though civil society recognizes the legitimacy 
of the ruling government, it is always alert to 
irregularities in policy implementation, such 
as arbitrariness, illegality, and irrationality, 
stressing instead comprehensiveness, public 
interests, and morality.
Civil society utilized a number of strategies 
in the democratization campaign, such as 
monitoring public policy, anti-candidate 
campaigns, protection of civil rights and 
freedom, checks on government activities 
and politics, and the presentation of policy 
alternatives based on expertise.
Nevertheless, it is said that there are some 
shortcomings in the civil society movement. 
As the democratic behaviours of people and 
establishment of democratic political culture 
are still in a formative state, the voluntary and 
active participation and organization of hu-
man resources is limited. Moreover, civil soci-
ety movements often struggle to develop fea-
sible alternatives to the policies they criticize. 
These new features of the civil society 
movement need to be recognized in the 
perspective of institutionalizing conflicts 
to reach a new level of democratization in 
Korean society.
Establishment and Function
of NHRCK 
1. National Human Rights Commission: 
background
 There are some provisions respecting human 
rights in the Constitution of Korea, but these 
civil rights are too vulnerable to political 
powers to depend on only governmental 
bodies. In the 1990s, civil society focused 
its desire for democratization on the 
establishment of the National Human Rights 
Institution (NI). NI was then a relatively 
recent development in the promotion and 
protection of human rights. According to the 
Paris Principles, NIs are usually entrusted with 
the three-fold task of promoting awareness 
and education about human rights, advising 
and assisting government, and investigating 
alleged human rights violations. 
 As the basic task of political democratization 
was attained in Korean society, establishing an 
institutionalized mechanism for monitoring 
state power in the process of perfecting the 
democratic system was unavoidable. Many 
representatives from NGOs participated 
in the 1993 World Conference on Human 
Rights in Vienna, when nobody knew how 
long it would take to establish the NI. But 
the participation and their later initiative to 
establish NI in Korea created the cornerstone 
for the organization of the independent 
NHRCK in November 2001.
At that time, a political struggle between 
the Ministry of Justice and human rights 
organizations in civil society dominated 
the whole process. The Ministry’s bill to set 
up NI under its jurisdiction was eventually 
abandoned due to the opposition of civil 
society, which pushed for an independent 
governmental institution.
2. Mandates of NHRCK 
 NI’s functions are distinct in the sense that 
no other state institutions are expected or 
required to fulfill the solemn responsibility 
to respect human rights in the process of 
exercising state power. 
 NHRCK has the following mandates:  
-  Investigation and research of statutes, 
legal system, policies and practices 
related to human rights
-  Investigation and remedy of HR violations 
and discriminatory acts
-  Survey on human rights conditions
-  Education on human rights
-  Recommendation of guidelines on hu-
man rights violations
-  Cooperation with NGOs and international 
organizations related to human rights
These mandates are the basic minimum core 
required to meet international human rights 
standards in Korean society. In the process to 
promote and protect human rights, NGOs 
working with particular vulnerable groups are 
a vital access point to the NI for vulnerable 
communities: indigenous or ethnic minority 
groups and organizations of women, people 
with disabilities, prisoners, children and so on. 
Some of these groups have been represented 
on the membership of commissioners’ meeting 
since the beginning of the NHRCK.
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3. Challenges Facing the NHRCK in the 
Democratization of Korea
 Of all state institutions, NI is distinctive 
because it is intended to serve, not to rule, 
the vulnerable and powerless. NI is also 
distinctive, in that support from international 
society and civil society is essential for its 
effective functioning. In this sense, NI can be 
understood as keeping the windows of the 
state wide open towards both international 
and civil society. The NHRCK faces the 
following challenges in the democratization 
of Korea as well as at the international level:
- reinforcement of institutionalized mech-
anisms to protect civil rights 
-  strengthening links of solidarity with in-
ternational organizations and NGOs for 
domestic implementation of internation-
al human rights standards.
-  preparation for the international demand 
to protect human rights in the Asia-Paci-
fic region and four other continents:
 Europe, Africa, North and South America.
-  contribution to the formation of interna-
tional human rights mechanisms
Recently, NI has received a broad mandate to 
police international standards because it may 
provide a more effective remedy than the various 
domestic and international mechanisms. As NIs 
have the reputation of being the most realistic 
means to implement international human rights 
standards, their role is expected to be more 
noticeable in the newly established UN Human 
Rights Council and treaty bodies.
Prospects for the Relationship 
between Civil Society and NI
As discussed above, the civil society movement 
led democratization, and the establishment of 
NHRCK was an outcome of the democratization 
movement. Our experience of operating NHRCK 
gave us many lessons in setting up the appropriate 
relationship between civil society and the NI. 
Even though NHRCK was indebted to the human 
rights organizations’ consistent efforts over more 
than 10 years, it is not supposed to directly reflect 
the opinion and intention of the civil society in 
decision-making, as each sector acts according to 
their respective mandates. This is also true of the 
NIs’ relationship with governmental bodies, given 
the reality that a large number of human rights 
violations are still committed by governmental 
institutions. 
Thus, the appropriate relation among NIs, NGOs 
and GOs needs to be set up with consideration 
of interdependence and independence in their 
mandates and human resources. Now that the 
NI has attained rapid development for decades 
depending on civil society, it can give a great deal 
of assistance to the fledgling human rights NGOs 
in civil society. Especially in the international 
human rights community like UN Human Rights 
Council, the interdependence with the civil 
society and government is one of the challenges 
that NI should meet in order to play a role as 
a bridge or a conduit of communication among 
social powers in the process of reviewing the 
human rights situation of a particular country. 
Actually NGO activists have a closer and more 
trusting relationship with grassroots communities. 
NGOs, by their very nature, have a freedom of 
expression, a flexibility of action and a liberty of 
movement that enables them to perform tasks 
which governments and NIs are unable or even 
unwilling to perform.
Finally, I would like to make sure that the discussion 
above is relevant to the Korean situation because 
it is very difficult to find a generalized logic to 
explain the Asia-Pacific situation, as it is an 
enormously diverse region in which human rights 
matters differ greatly from country to country. 
Even given these circumstances, the Asia-Pacific 
region has created a framework for cooperation 
on human rights, the Asia Pacific Forum of NHRIs 
(APF). Over the past ten years, all 16 member 
NIs have benefited from the APF in various areas, 
from establishment to operation to technical 
assistance, to promote and protect human rights 
at home and abroad.
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reCePtIon AnD reGIstrAtIon
WELCOMING ADDRESS AND OPENING REMARKS
Mahjoub El Haïba, General Secretary of the Consultative Committee 
for Human Rights, Morocco
•	 Nacer	Chraibi,	President,	Collectif	Démocratie	et	Modernité,	
Morocco
•	 Driss	Moussaoui,	Past	President,	Collectif	Démocratie	et	
Modernité 
•	 Jean-Louis	Roy,	President,	Rights	&	Democracy,	Canada	
breAK
rounDtAble 1 AnD DIsCussIon: DeMoCrACY, A unIVersAl 
VAlue?
Facilitator: 
Janice Stein, Chair of the Board of Directors, Rights & Democracy, 
Canada, and Director of the Munk Centre for International Studies, 
University of Toronto
Guido Riveros Franck, President and founder of the Bolivian 
Foundation for Multiparty Democracy, Bolivia
Istvan Gyarmati, Director of the International Centre for Democratic 
Transition (ICDT), Hungary
Saad Eddine Ibrahim, Political Sociology Professor of the American 
University of Cairo and General Secretary of the Egyptian 
Independent Commission for Electoral Review (ICER), Egypt 
Byunghoon Oh, Director of International Human Rights Team, 
National Human Rights Commission of South Korea, National Human 
Rights Commission of South Korea (NHRCK)
Hannah Foster, Executive Director of the African Center for 
Democracy and Human Rights Studies (ACDHRS), Gambia
Jean-François Lisée, Executive Director of the new International 
Studies Center (CERIUM) 
lunCh breAK
DAY 1
friday, June 8, 2007
8:00 AM - 9:00 AM
9:00 AM - 10:00 AM
10:00 AM - 10:30 AM
10:30 AM - 1:00 PM
Bolivia
Central and eastern Europe
The Arab world
Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
United States
1:00 PM - 2:30 PM
34
2:30 PM - 5:00 PM
Democracy and elections
Democracy and political 
parties
Democracy and equality
Democracy and information
5:00 PM - 5:30 PM
5:30 PM  - 6:30 PM
DAY 2
friday, June 9, 
2007
9:00 AM - 12:00 PM
The Indian model
The European model
Islam and secularization
10:30 AM - 11:00 AM
rounDtAble 2 AnD DIsCussIon :DeMoCrAtIC VAlues AnD 
PlurAlItY of PolItICAl sYsteMs
Facilitator:
Hind Taarji, Journalist and Writer, Morocco
Noureddine Ayouch, President of the 2007 Daba Association
Marc Mayrand, Chief Electoral Officer, Elections Canada
Gérard Latulippe, Director of the National Democratic Institute in Rabat and 
Senior Representative for the Maghreb region
Sima Samar, Chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights 
Commission and United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights in the Sudan (Darfur)
Dominique Payette, Sociologist, Journalist and Professor of Communications, 
Université Laval, Canada
breAK
Special Activity: Abdelaziz Bennani, First President of the Moroccan Human 
Rights Organization
rounDtAble 3 AnD DIsCussIon : DeMoCrACY AnD 
seCulArIZAtIon
Facilitator:
Mohamed Sghir Janjar, Director of the periodical Prologue, Morocco
Rajeev Bhargava, professor of political theory at the University of Delhi, India 
John Parisella, Concordia University, Canada
Mohamed El Ayadi, Sociologist and Historian,  Professor of Social Sciences 
and History of the Present at Université Hassan II Aïn Chock-Casablanca 
R’Kia Laoui, Professor of Educational Sciences, Université du Québec à 
Rimouski, Canada
Ayla Göl, Lecturer of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth
breAK
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lunCh breAK
rounDtAble 4: DeMoCrACY, CItIZenshIP AnD CIVIl soCIetY
Facilitator:
Sabah Chraibi, Doctor of Law and National President of Espace de la Femme 
pour la Solidarité et le Développement Maroc (ESPOD) (Women’s Space for 
Solidarity and Development, Morocco)
Driss El Yazami, General Secretary of the International Federation for Human 
Rights, Morocco
Nancy Riche, Past Executive Vice-president of the Canadian Labour Congress 
and past Vice-president of the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions, Canada 
Guido Riveros Franck, President and founder of the Bolivian Foundation for 
Multiparty Democracy, Bolivia
Byunghoon Oh, Director of International Human Rights Team, National 
Human Rights Commission of South Korea National Human Rights 
Commission of South Korea (NHRCK)
Fatimata M’Baye, Chairperson of Association mauritanienne des droits de 
l’Homme (Mauritanian Human Rights Association) and Vice-President of the 
International Federation for Human Rights 
breAK 
ClosInG ADDresses
Facilitator:
Jean-Louis Roy, President, Rights & Democracy, Canada
•	 Nacer	Chraibi,	President,	Collectif	Démocratie	et	Modernité,	Morocco
•	 Janice	Stein,	Chair	of	Board	of	Directors,	Rights	&	Democracy,	Canada	
and Director of the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of 
Toronto
•	 Driss	Moussaoui,	Past	President,	Collectif	Démocratie	et	Modernité
12:00 PM - 2:00 PM
2:00 PM - 4:30 PM
The case of Morocco
The case of Canada
Latin America
Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
4:30 PM - 5:00 PM
5:00 PM - 6:00 PM
Nacer Chraibi
Nacer Chraibi was professor of cardio-
logy from 1976 to 2004 at the Faculty 
of Medicine in Casablanca. He is parti-
cularly interested in strategies to prevent 
cardiovascular disease in developing 
countries. Dr. Chraibi is one of the foun-
ding members of the Collectif Démocratie 
et Modernité and has been its President 
since 2007. He is also Vice-president of 
the “Alternatives” Association since 1998 
and Secretary-General of the Moroccan 
foundation for youth, initiatives and 
development since 2000. He has writ-
ten over 165 articles, which have been 
published in national and international 
journals.
Ayla Göl
Ayla Göl is a graduate of the University 
of Ankara in Turkey and holds a PhD 
from the London School of Economics 
(LSE). Before joining the Department of 
International Politics at the University of 
Wales, Aberystwyth, she lectured at the 
Department of International Relations, 
LSE between 2003 and 2005. Her 
research interests include political Islam, 
the politics of developing countries, 
nationalism and Turkey.
Byunghoon Oh 
Byunghoon Oh is the Director of the 
international division of South Korea’s 
National Human Rights Commission 
(NHRCK). Created in 2001as an entity 
independent of the government, its role 
is to promote respect of human rights 
in South Korea. The Commission is 
responsible for carrying out investigations 
when complaints concerning violations 
of human rights are filed. Its mandate 
also includes significant research and 
public education components.
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